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ABSTRACT
The Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) launched with the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter
(LRO) on June 18, 2009. While the science function of the LCROSS mission was to determine the presence of
water-ice in a permanently-shadowed crater on the moon, the operational purpose was to be a pioneer for future lowcost, risk-tolerant small satellite NASA missions. Recent strategic changes at the Agency level have only furthered
the importance of small satellite missions.
NASA Ames Research Center and its industry partner, Northrop-Grumman, initiated this spacecraft project twoyears after its co-manifest mission had started, with less than one-fifth the budget. With a $79M total cost cap
(including operations and reserves) and 31-months until launch, LCROSS needed a game-changing approach to be
successful.
At the LCROSS Confirmation Review, the ESMD Associate Administrator asked the Project team to keep a close
record of lessons learned through the course of the mission and share their findings with the Agency at the end of the
mission. This paper summarizes the Project, the mission, its risk position, and some of the more notable lessons
learned.

and still fit within the stated programmatic constraints.
From this work, ARC developed and submitted six of
the nineteen mission proposals received by ESMD from
throughout the Agency, one of which was LCROSS - a
collaborative effort between ARC and its industrial
partner, Northrop-Grumman (NG) in Redondo Beach,
CA, USA.

THE LCROSS MISSION PROPOSAL
Early in 2006, the NASA Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate (ESMD) held a competition for NASA
Centers to propose innovative ideas for a secondary
payload mission to launch with the Lunar
Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) to the Moon. The
successful proposal could cost no more than $80
million dollars (less was preferred), would have to be
ready to launch with the LRO in 31 months, could
weigh no more than 1000 kg (fuelled), and would be
designated a risk-tolerant “Class D” mission. In effect,
NASA was offering a fixed-price contract to the
winning NASA team to stay within a cost and schedule
cap by accepting an unusually elevated risk position.

In the LCROSS proposal, ARC would manage the
mission, perform systems engineering and mission
design (teaming with NASA Goddard Space Flight
Center (GSFC) and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL)), conduct mission and science operations, and
design/develop the payload instrument suite while NG
would design and build the innovative spacecraft bus.

To address this Announcement of Opportunity to
develop a cost-and-schedule-capped secondary payload
mission to fly with LRO, NASA Ames Research Center
(ARC) in Moffett Field, CA, USA embarked on a
brainstorming effort termed “Blue Ice” in which a small
team was asked to explore a number of mission
scenarios that might have a good chance for success
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If successful, the LCROSS mission (Fig.1) would
conduct the first in-situ study of a pristine, permanently
shadowed lunar crater and test for the presence of water
ice in a permanently shadowed region, building on
previous lunar missions, Clementine and Lunar
Prospector.
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and guarantee no failure, or I could do three projects
1.
and even if one fails, I still get more done”
This key dialogue with the principal mission
stakeholder established the context for what would
make a successful LCROSS mission, i.e., cost and
schedule were key drivers and risks could be taken.
THE LCROSS SCIENCE MISSION
The scientific basis for the LCROSS mission had roots
in the Clementine (1994) and Lunar Prospector (1998)
Missions which performed complementary forms of
resource mapping. This mapping led the lunar science
community to conclude that there might be water-ice
trapped in permanently shadowed craters on the Moon.

Figure 1: The LCROSS Spacecraft
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The Clementine Mission was launched in 1994 from
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California aboard a
Titan IIG rocket. It was a joint project between the
Strategic
Defense
Initiative
Organization
in
Washington and NASA, with the objective of making
scientific observations of the Moon, assessing the
surface mineralogy, and obtaining lunar altimetry or
imagery from a fixed altitude.

THE LCROSS SELECTION
After a period of evaluation by ESMD and the Robotic
Lunar Exploration Program (RLEP), LCROSS was
selected in a somewhat dramatic “reveal” in
Washington DC shortly before it was announced at a
NASA press conference. Just prior to the television
cameras going live, ESMD Associate Administrator
(AA) Scott “Doc” Horowitz informed LCROSS Project
Manager Dan Andrews that ESMD had a very focused
purpose for LCROSS because it represented a type of
mission that “is not your father’s NASA”. Horowitz
acknowledged that there was a place for the heft and
conservatism of traditional NASA missions, primarily
in manned spaceflight, but that the Agency also needed
a way to accomplish tactical missions inexpensively,
given the financial constraints facing future Agency
budgets. In LCROSS, he saw an exciting mission, able
to inspire the public by determining if water-ice is
present on the Moon, while at the same time proving
there is a cost-effective way to execute meaningful
missions on a budget.
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The Lunar Prospector Mission was launched in 1998
aboard a Lockheed Martin solid-fuel, three-stage
Athena II rocket. The Lunar Prospector Mission was
the third selected by NASA for the Discovery Program.
Lunar Prospector was managed out of NASA ARC,
with Lockheed Martin as the prime contractor. The 19month mission was designed for a low polar orbit
investigation of the Moon, including mapping of
surface composition and possible polar ice deposits,
completely covering the lunar surface twice a month.
Originally, the mission was to have simply ended with
the spacecraft inevitably crashing into the lunar surface
once it expended all its fuel. As the mission neared its
end, however, the suggestion was made to use the crash
as part of an experiment to confirm the existence of
water on the Moon. The spacecraft was successfully
directed into a crater near the lunar South Pole, but the
impact plume was not significant, probably due to a
poor impact angle and low spacecraft mass.

After the press conference, Horowitz and Andrews
discussed how LCROSS could be a pathfinder project
for the Agency’s ability to make practical use of excess
launch capacity, while staying within tough cost &
schedule constraints. Noting that the Agency would
increasingly need to rely on smaller, high-leverage,
cost-capped missions, Horowitz asked Andrews to track
all that he learned over the next 31 months in bringing
LCROSS to a successful conclusion. This would
include how well the NASA Policy Requirements
(NPRs) served the project, the effectiveness of
acquisition processes, and how the Program Office and
Headquarters behaved with this unconventional project.
Using the LCROSS mission as a prototype, Horowitz
had a clear vision of how and where this type of
mission would fit within the NASA portfolio. As he
later stated in an interview, “I could triple the cost to try
Andrews

Both of these missions were instrumental in the lunar
ice question. In particular, the Lunar Prospector
Mission (LP) neutron measurements indicated elevated
hydrogen signatures in permanently-shadowed craters
on both the North and South poles of the Moon. In light
of these data, the science community wondered if these
elevated hydrogen signatures could be an indication of
the presence of water-ice, trapped just beneath the
regolith surface of the crater floors.
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If water does exist on the Moon, it could have arrived
the same way water did on Earth - through billions of
years of bombardment by meteors and comets.
However, because the Moon’s gravity is less than one
fifth of Earth’s gravity, the Moon retains practically no
atmosphere and any deposition on the Moon's surface
would be subject to direct exposure to both the vacuum
of space and daylight temperatures that reach up to
250° Fahrenheit. In the North and South polar regions,
however, the sun never rises above certain crater rims
so sunlight never reaches the crater floor. With
temperatures estimated to be near -328° Fahrenheit (200° C), these craters can “cold trap” or capture most
volatiles, such as water.
Given the expense of bringing water from Earth to the
surface of the moon (from $15K to $50K for the
equivalent of a ½ litre bottle), finding water-ice in
sufficient quantities in these permanently shadowed
craters could result in a compelling rationale for
locating lunar outposts in the vicinity of this valuable
resource. An in-situ resource like water that could be
converted to consumable water, breathable oxygen,
rocket fuel, and potentially even used as a means for
construction when combined with regolith, or as a
shielding means from solar radiation, would make
inhabitation and exploration of the Moon a much more
achievable future reality.

Figure 2: TheLRO/LCROSS Launch Vehicle Stack
on-board science instruments before impacting the
surface itself, about 4 minutes after the Centaur.
On June 18, 2009, LCROSS and LRO launched aboard
an Atlas V rocket from Cape Canaveral, in Florida,
USA. Once the Atlas V achieved the LRO lunar
insertion requirement, LRO separated, enabling it to
independently move forward on its mission, leaving
LCROSS and the still-attached Centaur behind. The
Centaur then performed a series of venting maneuvers
to eliminate gasses which could contaminate the lunar
impact measurement. The Centaur then became an
inert, empty vessel and an official part of the LCROSS
mission. Approximately five days after launch,
LCROSS entered into an extended Lunar GravityAssist, Lunar Return Orbit (LGALRO) by performing a
lunar-swing-by of the moon. The cruise phase of the
mission lasted slightly more than 100 days before
entering into the terminal phase of the mission. In the
meantime, LCROSS’ long, high-inclination orbit
around the Earth gave the LRO mission time to
commission its instruments and collect data about the
South Pole craters to help the LCROSS science team
refine target crater selection. In fact, this LRO data led
to LCROSS changing the impact crater from Cabeus-A
to Cabeus. Cabeus had more relevant conditions related
to the fundamental water question, but was a much
deeper crater. Although it was known that this crater
change would negatively impact Earth observations, it
was the scientifically proper strategy for the mission

THE LCROSS MISSION
LCROSS proposed to conduct a low-cost, fast-track
companion mission to launch with LRO. The Atlas
launch vehicle used for the LRO mission consists of a
booster stage and the Centaur upper stage. The
LCROSS spacecraft would be mounted atop the
Centaur with the LRO spacecraft mounted atop
LCROSS (Fig. 2).
With a mass constraint of 1000 Kg, LCROSS proposed
to use the upper stage of the Atlas-V rocket (the
“Centaur”), normally space junk after delivering a
payload, to effectively triple the size of its working
payload. By repurposing the spent Centaur to LCROSS,
mission planners were able to stay within the 1000 Kg
mass budget allotted to the secondary payload while
gaining approximately 2300 Kg of mass “for free”.
Proposing the use the Centaur as a lunar kinetic
impactor, LCROSS would “drop” the 2300 Kg rocket
(about the weight of a large sports utility vehicle) into a
permanently-shadowed crater, at a speed of 1.5
miles/second (2.5 km/s) or three times the speed of a
bullet, to kick-up a plume of material from the crater
floor. The 1000 Kg LCROSS “Shepherding Spacecraft”
would then collect and transmit data about the impact
and plume back to LCROSS mission control using nine
Andrews
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because the first priority of the LCROSS PM and
science team was to assure scientific relevance.
During the cruise phase, LCROSS maintained its Earth
cruise orbit by executing several Trajectory Correction
Maneuvers (TCMs) to provide for the final lunar
approach required to position the Centaur for its
ballistic lunar impact. Following the final TCM, the
Centaur and the Shepherding Spacecraft separated
about nine hours before impact (Fig. 3) followed by the

Figure 4: LCROSS Impact Plume

Figure 5: LCROSS Centaur Impact Crater
Figure 3: LCROSS Separating from Centaur

Spacecraft continued its delayed decent, cameras and
sensors in the instrument suite were able to measure the
constituents of the Centaur ejecta plume, observing and
measuring all the way down to the inevitable impact on
the Moon four minutes later. The sensors on LRO were
able to make notable measurements of the nature of the
ejecta and impact plume, providing excellent
complementary data on the LCROSS impact.

Shepherding Spacecraft performing a braking maneuver
to enable the released Centaur to impact the Moon first.
This delay provided time for the Shepherding
spacecraft to observe the ejecta plume arising from the
Centaur impact. The Centaur’s impact is estimated to
have excavated 250-350 metric tons of regolith, leaving
an impact crater approximately 82 feet (25 m) in
diameter. LCROSS thermal images of the ejecta plume
development and the resultant Centaur crater as seen by
the LCROSS NIR camera while 14km above the crater
3
floor, can be seen in Figs. 4 & 5 .

THE LCROSS PAYLOAD INSTRUMENTS
The LCROSS instrument payload was designed to
provide mission scientists with multiple complimentary
views of the debris plume created by the Centaur
impact. The instrument suite consisted of nine
instruments: one visible, two near-infrared and two
mid-infrared cameras; one visible and two near-infrared
spectrometers; and a photometer - all optimized to
answer the fundamental question about water ice.

LCROSS discovered that regolith in this permanently
shadowed crater was very fine with a talc-like
consistency. Much of the kinetic energy of the Centaur
impact was converted into thermal energy into the local
soil creating a notable vapor cloud. Less energy went
into rock and dirt ejecta being thrown upward given the
nature of the crater floor regolith. As the Shepherding

Andrews
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success is permitted”, so this type of mission can fail.
Class D designation is typically applied to small
missions that are constrained in some way making it
harder to assure mission success. For LCROSS, the
Agency Class D designation was in place to improve
the likelihood it could make the LRO launch date,
within budget.

LCROSS Science
As the impact debris plume rises above the target
crater’s rim, it is exposed to sunlight and any water-ice,
hydrocarbons or organics are vaporized and break down
into their basic components. These components are
primarily monitored by the visible and infrared
spectrometers. The near-infrared and mid-infrared
cameras determine the total amount and distribution of
water in the debris plume. The spacecraft’s visible
camera tracks the impact location and the behavior of
the debris plume while the visible photometer measures
the flash created by the Centaur impact. Finally, to
gather all this instrument data together, LCROSS
employs a Data Handling Unit (DHU) for transmission
back to LCROSS Mission Control.

LCROSS AS A CLASS D MISSION
When LCROSS was cast as a Class D mission,
technical risk officially became part of the mission
trade space. Because the mission was cost-capped, cost
maintenance was essential. The Project cost cap had to
be maintained even if at the expense of technical
requirements as the mission could be cancelled if the
cost cap was exceeded. LCROSS was also scheduleconstrained since it had to make the LRO launch date.
As a result, LCROSS was permitted to waive
performance requirements or take additional risk as
necessary to fit into the schedule and cost constraints.

These instruments were selected to be low-cost, rugged,
commercially available components for an Earth
environment. However, to ensure survival in both space
and launch environments, the LCROSS payload team
needed to put the individual instruments though
rigorous testing to simulate launch and the conditions in
space. When that testing revealed weaknesses, the team
worked with the manufacturers to strengthen their
designs for satisfactory use in the LCROSS mission.

The Program Office handled the Level 2 (L2)
requirements levied on the LCROSS Project in a similar
manner, establishing “Minimum” and “Full Success
Criteria” to set priorities if requirements trades had to
be made. The L2 requirements document specifically
listed, by number, the requirements that were Minimum
Success criteria, leaving the rest to be Full Success
criteria and able to be traded if required. This document
effectively told LCROSS Project Management, “if you
are forced to start dumping some of your requirements,
here’s how we’d like you to prioritize them.” Achieving
concurrence up front on acceptable ways to make
contingency trades saved time and heartache as the
mission progressed.

NASA CLASS D MISSIONS
A key enabling factor for LCROSS success was its
designation by the ESMD Associate Administrator as a
risk-tolerant Class D mission. NASA classifies all
spaceflight missions into one of four categories based
on risk tolerance: Class A, B, C, and D. This
classification system has origins in the Department of
Defense (DoD) Military Standards (Mil-STDS)
documents which NASA has tailored into a Safety and
Mission Assurance (S&MA) NASA Procedural
4
Requirement (NPR 8705.4) .

Class D Challenges
As a Class D mission, LCROSS quickly discovered that
although the designation was adequately defined in the
cited NPR, there was little or no reference to this risk
classification in other NASA policy documents.
Further, approaches that the LCROSS team had the
latitude to execute may not have been permitted by
other NPRs, effectively driving the mission class
higher. As pioneers for the Class D mission
designation, LCROSS Project Management soon found
that internal contradictions and discontinuities between
policy documents were their problems to resolve.

Class A missions, at the risk intolerant end of the
spectrum, tend to be large, expensive missions, and/or
manned spaceflight missions where human lives are put
in harm’s way. Class A missions are typically
formulated with generous technical margins, schedule
slack and reserve dollars to address the need for
redundant systems and extensive testing to assure
requirements satisfaction with reliability – all of which
lead to elevated cost.
Class D missions, at the other end of the risk spectrum,
are the most risk-tolerant missions in NASA. While
safety concerns are treated no differently for a Class D
mission than a Class A mission, Class D missions are
allowed to be “single strung”, which means there is no
redundancy required. In fact, as it states in NPR 8705.4,
“Medium or significant risk of not achieving mission
Andrews

Another issue associated with the Class D risk
designation was its extensibility to the spacecraft
contractor, Northrop-Grumman. The NASA Class D
designation established a performance standard for the
execution of the Project, but it was not necessarily in
alignment with how the spacecraft contractor could
operate within their own corporate constraints. The NG
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part of the LCROSS team started the process of finding
their own equivalent of a Class D approach within their
existing, approved corporate processes. Although they
were able to find an existing approach that streamlined
oversight and approval processes to helped them to
come into Class D alignment, it required them to
address two important issues: 1) Is a corporate entity
willing/able to take the same risks of failure defined by
the NASA Class D mission designation and 2) Does
this work within their own framework of shareholders?
In the end, the answers were the same for NG and
ARC. Neither organization came together to manage
the LCROSS Project just to see it fail, regardless of
mission class. So the LCROSS team had to find ways to
keep risk in check while staying within the cost and
schedule caps.

Management successfully advocated for the Program
Office to pay for the cost of enhanced LCROSS testing.
MANAGING THE LCROSS RISK EQUATION
Managing the mission success risk equation for
LCROSS involved management of the three traditional
elements – cost, schedule, and technical capabilities.
Because cost and schedule were constrained, technical
capability was really the only element that could be
actively managed.
Cost Risk + Schedule Risk + Technical Risk = Mission Risk

Although LCROSS had a Class D mission designation
allowing a higher-than-normal mission risk, it was in
everyone’s interest to keep that risk as low as possible
to increase the chances of success. By definition then,
the technical capability risk also had to be kept as low
as possible, primarily by keeping the complexity level
as low as possible.

One of the burdens of being a pathfinder for the Class
D mission construct was the need to advocate for new
approaches with stakeholders. For NASA stakeholders,
LCROSS advocated for approaches that involved
tailoring existing policies rather than waiving policies
altogether. This approach avoided time-consuming
resistance to waiving which leads to stakeholder
questions such as, “This procedural requirement is in
place because past experience shows that this
requirement is a wise thing to do… so justify why you
do not feel it is wise for your project”? For NG
corporate stakeholders, both tailoring and waiving
existing processes had to be employed to gain
acceptance, particularly from NG mission assurance
organizations. In fact, the NG Project Manager for
LCROSS once said, “We had to create a waiver to the
waiver process”, since he had to overcome the same
difficulties as the ARC Project Manager did with
NASA stakeholders.

Lowering Complexity Lowers Risk
If a system is designed to be low in complexity, extra
margin is effectively added to the technical risk element
– margin that can be traded if developmental difficulties
are encountered later on in the project. For example, if
procurement is taking longer than planned, thereby
increasing schedule risk in a schedule-capped mission,
that risk can be reduced by reducing the unit-level
testing that was originally planned. While not testing at
a unit level runs the risk of problems not emerging until
box-level testing occurs, if the system is of lowcomplexity, the risk of that occurring might be worth
the trade. If that unit-level device has been proven on a
previous mission and is being re-used in the same way
as on that previous mission, the risk may be small. If
the card in which testing is reduced is easily
removed/replaced from the avionics box, making a later
discovery of a problem would not represent a large
problem and thus, may be worth the trade.
Alternatively, continuing with all the unit and
subsystem level testing is also an option, but it reduces
the degree of integrated systems testing to a minimum
to recover schedule. Judgment is required to make these
trades, and there is technical risk. The key is to find
ways to keep that risk in check, even in a risk-tolerant
environment.

Finally, there was the challenge of integrating the Class
D LCROSS mission with the Class B/C LRO and the
Class A Atlas launch vehicle. In the end, the lowest
common denominator, i.e., least risk-tolerant approach,
prevailed, which was counter to the LCROSS context.
For example, in the case of structural margins,
LCROSS had done some analysis calculations that
showed generous margins on natural frequencies of the
propulsion tank and the secondary structure. Atlas and
LRO concurred that the computed frequencies were
good numbers, but wanted additional verification of
those numbers that were based only on analysis.
Because this level of additional verification was in
alignment with the mission risk position for LRO,
LCROSS was forced to conduct testing on the structure
and propellant tank to verify the analysis. Because the
monies expended to satisfy another mission’s risk
position exceeded the LCROSS cost cap, Project
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Capabilities-Driven Missions Lower Risk
Keeping that technical risk in check meant the
LCROSS mission was not about pushing the limits of
technology and performance. This particular mission
was about doing as much as possible within existing
capabilities of the system. In other words, “We want it
5
all, but we know we need appetite suppressants.”
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Capability-driven missions like LCROSS are exactly
what the name implies: working to achieve
requirements by staying as much as possible within the
capabilities of the system. This is very different than
many science-driven NASA missions where needed
capabilities are defined and then efforts to meet them
are defined to meet the mission requirements. That
approach is too open-ended and can involve a full
development and test cycle which is fraught with risk
and can be costly in schedule consumption. LCROSS
6
was a Design-to-Cost project, working within cost and
schedule constraints that were the principal drivers for
the project. By working as much as possible with
existing designs, LCROSS had a set of proven
capabilities that helped to contain cost and schedule.

unit as well, LCROSS could avoid the risk of
developing custom, flight-ready blackbox solutions for
each instrument, thereby saving both development
effort and risk. In the end, the other instrument vendors
were able to deploy an RS-422 interface option that
enabled their units to work with the visible camera
vendor’s single-point data handling unit. Once the
instruments were “glued” to the data handling unit
through the use of a common RS-422 data format, the
data handler was “glued” to the spacecraft avionics
through the use of another standard data protocol –
again saving untold hours in development and in-flight
suitability testing - and reducing overall risk.
Spacecraft Glue
In science-driven missions, the development of a
spacecraft bus frequently involves a custom design
tailored to the particular needs of the mission – a laborintensive effort that also requires costly verification for
flight suitability. In the capabilities-driven LCROSS
mission, an existing, proven piece of hardware called an
ESPA (Evolvable Secondary Payload Adaptor) ring
(Fig. 6), which was already designed for flight on the
launch vehicle, was chosen to be the basis of the
LCROSS spacecraft bus. Originally designed to carry

The perfect incarnation of a capability-driven project
requires little to no modifications over what has been
done before. Everything is not only flight-proven, but
proven in the identical arrangement and configuration
of how it will be used on the project. Clearly, this
scenario is not typical, so a real Design-to-Cost project
needs to carry sufficient risk margins for not only the
unknowns, but for the inevitable effort required to
address the risk associated with expanding capabilities
where required. Of course, requirements descope is
always an option as it effectively designs in technical
risk margin to accommodate more mass or power needs
as the project evolves.
“Glue Missions” Lower Risk
By using and “gluing together” already-proven
hardware, software, and Integration & Test (I&T)
approaches, the residual technical risk for LCROSS
resided primarily in the design effort of “gluing” the
components together, as well as general component
workmanship issues which are always present. In
addition to lowering technical risk, “Glue Missions”
also tend to keep cost and schedule risk in check
because the simplicity and heritage extensibility makes
it less likely extra time and money will be needed to
remediate a problem.

Figure 6: LCROSS ESPA Ring

Payload Glue

multiple secondary payloads at six circular ports around
the perimeter of the ring while simultaneously
supporting the loads from a primary payload mounted
on top, the ESPA ring’s purpose was to make use of
excess launch capability for multiple secondary
payloads. LCROSS, however, was the first to use this
standardized capability to develop the backbone of a
spacecraft, using the ports to mount various elements of
a single spacecraft. One port supported the solar array;
another port supported the battery panel; another port
supported the payload instruments, etc. (Fig. 7).

LCROSS was conceived using Commercial Off The
Shelf (COTS) instruments from various vendors best
suited to meet the mission needs. When COTS
instruments are used, however, the issue of getting all
the instruments to successfully communicate with the
spacecraft avionics inevitably arises. The visible
camera vendor for the LCROSS payload had an
interface unit which enabled a number of their cameras
to be connected to a single interface point and was a
standard product. If the cameras and instruments from
other vendors could be configured to interface with this
Andrews
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The standardized ESPA hardware provided the “glue”
to connect the primary and secondary mission payloads
together without the need for costly customized systems
or components. As an added bonus, using the ESPA
ring resulted in a more resilient assembly process for
LCROSS as each of the panels could be worked-on
independently.

Figure 8: LCROSS Mission Ops Control Room
directing the Centaur into the chosen crater, so those
requirements were primary. Secondary requirements
were those that would achieve Full Mission Success for
LCROSS. Secondary requirements necessarily involved
the payload instruments because Full Success Criteria
required the LCROSS spacecraft to perform in-situ
measurements determining the presence and quantity of
water-ice. Tertiary requirements, then, were those that
would be interesting to have, but not required for
achieving primary or secondary success criteria.

Figure 7: LCROSS ESPA Ring and Secondary
Panels

Thus, the LCROSS mission requirements could be
categorized as follows:

Mission Operations Glue

Minimum (primary) Success Requirements - needed to
assure the impactor is sent into a targeted, permanently
shadowed crater.

Traditional spacecraft control rooms are expensive
operations, filling large rooms with wall-to-wall people
and monitor screens. To stay under the cost cap,
LCROSS had to find a different approach, so a humble
control room with a series of personal computers was
set up and “glued” together over a local secure network
(Fig. 8). Not flashy, but fully functional, the LCROSS
Ground Data System (GDS) ran the same software that
was used during Integration & Test to leverage training
and investments made earlier in the project, and again,
to keep technical risk in check.

Full (secondary) Success Requirements - needed to
assure the impactor is sent into a targeted, permanently
shadowed crater, and the LCROSS spacecraft is able to
make in-situ water-ice measurements of the ejecta
plume.
Extended Full (tertiary) Success Requirements – needed
to assure the impactor is sent into a targeted,
permanently shadowed crater, and the LCROSS
spacecraft is able to make in-situ water-ice
measurements of the ejecta plume and make other
interesting measurements related to the ejecta plume.

MANAGING LCROSS REQUIREMENTS
Given the LCROSS mission success equation with its
cost-and-schedule constraints, managing technical
capabilities in the form of project requirements became
even more important. LCROSS project requirements
defined the critical performance metrics of the mission
as well as the previously mentioned success criteria.

By prioritizing requirements in this manner,
requirements could be cut from the third category, and
possibly the second without endangering mission
success, should the need arise. For example, if it were
determined that the LCROSS Shepherding Spacecraft
could not be separated from the Centaur on orbit, all
requirements from the second and third categories
would be eliminated because the payload instruments

Although the LCROSS minimum success criteria
required no performance from the payload at all, the
spacecraft pointing performance was still required to
meet the minimum mission success requirements of
Andrews
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would become part of the Centaur impact. However, the
mission would still be considered a success even if the
entire stack was crashed into the Moon, as long as the
Minimum Success Requirements were met and impact
took place in a targeted, permanently shadowed crater.

equipment - all proven on other missions – reduced the
risk/uncertainty of performance on LCROSS. Along
with proven capabilities came bounded cost. By using
existing hardware, cost risk remained in check. When
existing designs are altered, development risk - and the
cost for covering that risk - increases.

MANAGING CAPABILITIES-DRIVEN
MISSIONS

By employing capabilities-driven management,
LCROSS adhered to the Design-to-Cost process and
was able to meet all cost, schedule, and technical
capability mission requirements.

With the list of mission requirements clearly prioritized,
LCROSS implemented the previously discussed
Design-to-Cost process using existing capabilities.
COTS instruments were sought for payloads. Although
flight-proven instruments were preferred (the visible
camera was flight-proven), well-established instruments
from the commercial or industrial world that were
already ruggedized to improve the feasibility of use in a
space and launch environment were accepted. Those
instruments were subsequently tested in relevant
environments
(vacuum,
temperature
extremes,
vibration, etc.) to see if the units could withstand
anticipated mission conditions. Instrument vendors,
interested in opening new markets for their products
and happy that such rigorous use-testing was being
funded by the government, were cooperative in
upgrading their products when issues were discovered.
For example, one instrument failed because a screw
came loose during vibrational testing. It was discovered
that no adhesive had been applied to the screw threads
to help secure the screws in a dynamic load
environment. Once adhesive was applied, the device
passed testing and was accepted for use. In another
case, a cable came loose inside an instrument because
the cable was not staked-down to help reduce the length
of unsupported cable experiencing the loads of a launch
environment. This, too, was easily remedied.

LESSONS LEARNED
When LCROSS successfully passed its Confirmation
Review in which the Project was officially greenlighted to be a flight mission, the LCROSS Project
Manager provided a courtesy outbrief to the ESMD
Associate Administrator, Scott “Doc” Horowitz. The
outbrief discussed LCROSS scope, approaches, and
plans. Very interested in the execution of this novel
mission, Horowitz made the following specific request
of the LCROSS team in front of his entire executive
staff:
“I want you to take lots of notes as you go through the
mission and come back here and brief me on what
you’ve learned over the course of LCROSS. I think
there will be much that can be applied even to Class A
missions.”
Although Horowitz was no longer the AA for ESMD
when the mission struck the moon in 2009,the LCROSS
Team honored their commitment and briefed ESMD
with the following series of top “Lessons-Learned”
which were culled from the hundreds collected and
officially submitted to The Agency Office of Chief
Engineer

The final suite of LCROSS instruments included a
thermal camera (MID-IR1) used in motorsports
applications, Near-IR spectrometers (NSP1 & NSP2)
used in beer-making and carpet fiber analysis for
assessing recyclability, UV visible spectrometers
(UVS) used in standard bench-top laboratory
equipment, a visible camera routinely used in shuttle
launch imagery, and Near-IR cameras (NIR-cam) used
in fiber optic communications applications. All of these
were existing hardware that was repurposed for the
LCROSS space mission.

LESSON: Embed Mission Operations (MOS) Staff in
Spacecraft Testing
The LCROSS cost-capped mission did not have the
budget for a shadow MOS team to be available
throughout project development that could then fly the
mission and develop all the requisite products required
during development. So a novel approach was
formulated to make use of embedded NASA engineers
at Northrop-Grumman. The first NASA engineer was
embeded with Northrop-Grumman during LCROSS
spacecraft “FlatSat” testing, when all the avionics were
connected together and tested with the flight software.
This “Liaison Engineer” did not simply observe
activities as if in a mission assurance role. He was there
to truly embed with the technical work doing early
verification of the flight software and avionics. This
approach proved to be so effective that the Liason
Engineer started writing scripts and executing them as a

To employ existing capabilities for the LCROSS
spacecraft, well-proven, flight-demonstrated hardware
was chosen, some of which was even re-purposed. The
best example of this was the previously described
ESPA ring, originally designed to mount between a
launch vehicle and spacecraft it is carrying, but used by
LCROSS as a spacecraft structure. Avionics, batteries,
propellant tank, thrusters, transponder, and other
Andrews
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full member of the team, quickly garnering full trust
and even accolades from the NG team.

before the power generated by the system was
insufficient, or “power negative”. This freeboard on
electrical power meant not only that the mission could
consume more power than planned, it could also be
used as an added resource to handle emergencies.

The same approach was taken later in the project when
LCROSS entered into spacecraft Integration & Test
(I&T) and embedded another NASA engineer with the
NG team. This engineer also got closely involved in the
verification activities, and in doing so, was able to
participate in the resolution of integration issues and
witness the emerging “personality” of the spacecraft.

For example, on orbit it was discovered that two of
thruster propellant lines were getting sufficiently cold
to be dangerously close to freezing the propellant in the
lines, thereby running the risk of a line breach. The root
cause of this proved to be related to the location of the
heater thermostats. The mitigation option would be to
consider re-writing the flight software to trigger the
heaters earlier based on thermistor feedback, but flight
software changes are very dangerous as they break
systems verification which can result in unintended
consequences elsewhere in the code. Having a power
“freeboard”, however, meant that instead of changing
the flight software code, LCROSS could tolerate being
pointed a bit off sun, using the sun to heat the thrusters
and lines directly. This was accomplished by yawing
spacecraft 20[deg] toward the sun which effectively
raised the rear thrusters out from behind the shadow of
the spacecraft, exposing them directly to the sun’s heat.
.Although this maneuver caused the solar array to no
longer be pointing directly at the sun, the existence of
the LCROSS power “freeboard” still meant there were
still sufficient power resources for the mission.
Additionally, LCROSS had plenty of battery capacity
onboard which meant that the hot solar array could
store more energy for use in failsafe scenarios where
the spacecraft is put into a non-solar facing “drift” state,
allowing it to go power-negative to preserve propellant.
Having that extra power capacity meant the spacecraft
could be in such a state for longer periods of time,
providing a more robust recovery.

While this embedding clearly benefitted the LCROSS
Project Manager and Project Systems Engineer by
providing a virtual presence in the activities, it also
proved to have other benefits when the two embedded
engineers became the Flight Controllers for the
LCROSS mission. These NASA engineers became the
people who issued all commands to the spacecraft and
had some of the best understanding of that spacecraft’s
behavior. Also, when anomalous events did occur, the
experience these engineers gained by being embedded
with the NG team brought valuable insight to
discussion of those anomalies. Of course, the NASA
LCROSS Ops team had employed NG in a “back
room” capacity for monitoring the spacecraft, but
having that first-hand knowledge available in the
Mission Ops Control Room proved to be invaluable.
The lesson here is to carefully consider the best
application of embedding staff, within existing budget
constraints. If there is plenty of money, then a very
large MOS team shadowing S/C I&T may be an option.
If not, then the careful, thrifty application of skills in
the mix of activities can be very helpful.
LESSON: Have Technical Freeboard Somewhere
LCROSS was cast as a Class D mission, which means it
can accept more technical risk than other mission types
in NASA. So why have “freeboard”, a.k.a. extra
technical margin? As noted earlier, one of the ways that
LCROSS kept its risk in check was by keeping
complexity as low as possible while satisfying project
requirements. To address the remaining complexity in
the design, having technical performance measures
which have a fair amount of margin could be
invaluable. This extra margin is a commodity that can
be used in many different and sometimes unplanned
ways during the mission. Extra fuel, power, thermal, or
RF link can provide operational degrees of freedom
when anomalies are encountered.

Another LCROSS “freeboard” area was with its fuel
margin. This margin was a product of having made use
of an existing tank size (recall the importance of
capabilities-driven) and larger than needed to execute
the mission. This extra capacity proved its worth at
least twice during the mission. In one case, the Centaur
fill/drain valves leaked more than anticipated and
represented a disturbance force to LCROSS which
consumed more propellant to offset. In another case, an
on-orbit anomaly caused excessive firing of the
LCROSS thrusters which consumed considerably more
propellant than planned.. In each of these cases, having
the freeboard on fuel reserves helped the mission
survive.

LCROSS had “freeboard” margin with its power
system. The LCROSS solar array was electrically
“hot”, meaning it generated much more power than was
actually needed to execute the mission. As a result,
LCROSS could point as much as 60 degrees off of sun
Andrews
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spacecraft and of the team. Unfortunately, these labor
and facility-intensive activities may consume a great
deal of financial resources – the cost-capped project’s
most precious commodity. TTAYF was employed on
LCROSS to attempt to strike a balance between the
value of testing and training and the cost of doing so.
As a result, LCROSS had to focus on the most
meaningful and relevant performance of both the
hardware and the people.

having to deal with potential declaration of emergency
to get more time to safe the spacecraft. The operations
team definitely benefitted from this type of training
when the real mission was flown and real anomalies
were experienced.
LESSON: NASA Policy Documents Do Not Cross-Cut
Mission Class
The lesson only applies to NASA missions, but it is a
critical one. The whole Class D premise comes from a
NASA Policy Requirement called NPR 8705.4. As
discussed earlier, this document defines, in somewhat
vague terms, what it means to be a Class A, B, C, or D
mission. LCROSS’ approaches with Class D were
based in this NPR, and similar NG policy documents.

Test As You Fly verifies spacecraft functionality in the
ways it will be required to perform on orbit. LCROSS
could not perform a full suite of qualification testing
due to cost constraints, but still needed to ensure that
the basic mission was viable. So qualification testing
for off-nominal anomaly-handling, although a nice to
have, would have to be addressed by the Ops team
when anomalies actually surfaced.

NPR 8705.4 is helpful in providing a construct, but is
somewhat vague, which gives projects and stakeholders
some room to tailor their activities – a good thing;
however, where the problem surfaces is with the many
other NASA Policy Requirements which do not address
mission class at all. Good examples are NPR 7120.5
which is the Policy document covering the management
of projects and programs, and NPR 7123.1 which is the
Agency’s Systems Engineering NPR defining technical
performance requirements. These two NPRs are critical,
foundational NPRs which the stakeholders use to assure
that the NASA project is executing to the defined
standards of the Agency. The problem of course is that
these NPRs apply to missions of all costs, sizes,
importance levels, and yes, mission class. Without
separate delineation of mission class in these
foundational requirements documents, small team Class
D projects are carrying the same requirements as much
larger Flagship missions. There is the ability to waive
requirements, but the process of waiving necessarily
comes with the burden of advocating, explaining, and
defending the waiver. Unintentionally, these one-sizefits-all rules encumber the small team with adjudication
efforts of the stakeholders.

Train As You Fly verifies that the Ops team can handle
the actual nominal activities of the mission. This
training was done first with “Engineering Readiness
Tests” (ERTs), and then later with “Operational
Readiness Tests” (ORTs). ERTs required all
operational functionality be in place to fly the mission
(telemetry, commanding, ground station connectivity
operator screens complete, etc), but was not conducted
in real time. ORTs were the exact same thing, but
conducted in real time. In fact, they were not only
conducted in real time duration, but at the real time of
the day, so that the team could experience carrying a
shift in the middle of the night when they might be tired
and hungry. The value of the ERTs was that it revealed
any technical or procedural flaws with the plan and
could be adapted as needed to make sure everything
was feasible. The value of the ORTs was that staff had
to endure real-time decision-making and mission stress,
revealing weaknesses with a small team. Further,
during the ORTs, the Test Conductor, who did not have
an official console position, would “throw sticks in the
spokes” of the operations folks to test their
responsiveness. At the end of an ORT, the Test
Conductor would discuss all he did to the team, and
most importantly, evaluate how quickly they were able
to see anomalies he introduced, and in some cases,
minor anomalies they never saw. The Test Conductor
addition to the ORTs cost only one additional FTE and
proved to be invaluable. It was common during an ORT
for the spacecraft to lose an Inertial Reference Unit
(IRU), or the telemetry would grow stale due to a lost
ground station link, or a console location would lose
power, etc, etc. The team treated these ORT exercises
very seriously as if they were actually flying a
spacecraft. Further, since ORTs are run in real time, the
operation crew had to react in a timely manner, noting
things like a communication pass about to expire and
Andrews

Classification of a mission as “D” is put in place to help
it be successful with programmatic constraints, but the
reality is that the small team finds itself in the position
of having to define/justify Class D activities to multiple
stakeholder parties of different views – making more
work for the team. The Agency is thus advised to
consider creating a lightweight pathway for small
satellite / small-team missions which is not overly
prescriptive, but offers requirements options that can
achieve lower project overhead.

11

24th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

LESSON: Risk Tolerant Missions Require Good Risk
Management

and outside the Agency, where requirements creep by
the stakeholders becomes the undoing of the project,
leading to its ultimate failure in requirements, schedule
and/or budget. Requirements creep usually manifests
itself by a multitude of “minor change requests” that
slowly disrupt the team’s focus and eventually lead to
some systems engineering difficulties.

Perhaps the most important lesson learned by the
LCROSS team was that even risk-tolerant missions
need to employ good risk management practices to be
successful.
Given the cost constraints of mission, LCROSS could
not afford to eliminate risk – a goal more appropriately
associated with Class A missions where people’s lives
hang in the balance. For Class D missions like
LCROSS, there is simply not enough time or money.
So if the LCROSS team could not eliminate risk, what
risks should be mitigated and what risks left alone? It
became apparent that LCROSS required very careful
risk management specifically because it could accept
elevated levels of technical risk. LCROSS Risk
Management Boards (RMBs) had to study risk
impact/likelihood and carefully trade risks against each
other. Although initially thought to be a tedious, long,
and encumbering process, RMBs were ultimately seen
by the LCROSS team as having great importance. They
were never fun, but the team leads were always good
with their attendance because they knew they had to
strike a balance to meet their own schedule and cost
objectives.

Stable requirements are essential to minimize
perturbations to the team momentum. An example came
early in the LCROSS mission prior to the Preliminary
Design Review (PDR). The LCROSS PM was
approached by a senior stakeholder asking to add the
capability of two wireless routers from a local high-tech
firm to the mission, along with accompanying wireless
cameras to be able to demonstrate the first use of
wireless routers in space. Although an enticing idea at
first, (who wouldn’t want to do this!) the team
conducted an investigation on what such an
implementation would involve and found that while this
was not a big tax on any single performance metric, it
was a small tax on nearly every performance metric.
Everything from mass, to volume, to power, to thermal,
to flight worthiness, to testing, etc was affected. This
“small change”, even pre-PDR was not only going to
change most everything, it would consume “freeboard
margins”. Further, it crossed ownership lines since one
of these units would have to fly on the Centuar, thereby
involving the launch provider’s design as well,
changing Interface Control Documents (ICDs) growing
system complexity. This was a mess. This genuinely
clever idea that the team actually wanted to implement,
was growing the project risk substantially, distracting
the team from the core project objectives. To the
stakeholder’s credit, they were able to back away from
this request.

An interesting example of this, which occurred in many
RMBs, was when a risk mitigation discussion led to not
executing a mitigation. During a discussion of a
payload instrument risk, the team of engineers was
discussing ways to mitigate the risk with this change or
that, adding heaters or making some aspect redundant,
etc. when they realized that the risk under discussion
was being driven lower than the composite spacecraft
risk, i.e., assuring the payload was less likely to
experience a failure than the spacecraft that was
carrying it! This was when the team really understood
what it meant to be Class D. It meant having a
sufficient understanding of the risks to know when to
not mitigate and, instead, liquidate, i.e. save the
mitigation money and schedule for other purposes. This
approach is not easy, but if cost/schedule are
independent variables, technical risk needs to managed
as the dependent variable.

LCROSS PROGRAMMATIC SUMMARY
The key to capabilities-driven, cost-capped missions
like LCROSS is to keep it simple and to manage the
risk equation. It is not about eliminating risk, which is
very costly. It is about managing risk to a level
commensurate with project programmatic constraints.
LCROSS did this by making use of existing
investments by the Agency, existing commercial
hardware, and being sufficiently creative to see
opportunities to buy-down risk.

LESSON: Stable Stakeholder Requirements Are
Essential

Ultimately, LCROSS succeeded because the individuals
and organizations in the LCROSS team walked a shared
road on a mission to the Moon and worked together to
make it succeed. Each party on this team had both
mutual and self-interests for why they wanted to
participate. The Agency wanted to show that there was
an effective way to make use of excess launch
capability and to work cheaply; NASA ARC wanted to

LCROSS was “decommissioned” with the same
requirements set in which it was initiated. Period. The
LCROSS team benefitted from having a stakeholder
community that was willing to establish a set of
requirements they could stand behind and not change. It
is difficult to explain how important this is to the
executing team. There are many examples, both inside
Andrews
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show it was able to run small, fast-paced, lightweight
missions; NG wanted to show that it could be nimble
and carve out a new market for itself; and the
commercial sector found an onramp to space and lunar
applications which could propel their businesses into a
new market. One of the great successes of LCROSS
was aligning each the team member’s needs into a
common purpose which benefited everyone in a winwin-win scenario.
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